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CASENOTE
In Pari Delicta Defense in Tippee-Tipper Lawsuits: Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner' — The common law defense of "in pari delicto" 2 denies recovery to
plaintiffs who have participated equally with defendants in an unlawful activity. 5 It is an
equitable defense designed to preserve judicial integrity by preventing wrongdoers from
using the courts to profit from their misdeeds. 4
 If the plaintiff's suit will advance public
policy aims, however, courts will not allow the defenses
Defendants have raised the in pari delicto defense in private actions alleging vio-
lations of the federal securities laws,e particularly rule 10b-5. 7
 Rule 10b-5, promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942 pursuant to section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 8 is a broad antifraud
1
 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
2
 In pari delicto literally means in equal fault." The defense derives from the Latin expression
"in pari delicto potior est condilio possidentis (defendentis)," which means "[On a case of equal or mutual
fault [between two parties] the condition of the party in possession [or defending] is the better
one." Fit.Acx's LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
See Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). Lord Mansfield stated that the
in pari delicto defense was based on the general principle that Ink) Court will lend its aid to a man
who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act." Id. See also Handler & Sacks, The
Continued Vitality of In Pari Delicto as an Antitrust Defense, 70 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1128-31 (1982)
(discussing origins of in pari delicto at common law) [hereinafter Handler & Sacks].
4
 Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1164 (3d Cir.) (citing Perma Life Mufflers v.
Inti Parts, 392 U.S. 134, 151 (1968) (Marshall, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
5 3 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 941 (5th ed. 1941).
See, e.g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981);
Tarasi, 555 F.2d 1152; Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enter., 527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam);
Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 225 (1975); James v.
DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969);
Index Fund v. Hagopian, 609 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton, 564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Grumet v. Shearson/
American Express, 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N. J. 1983); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508
F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979);
In re Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1985). Rule 106-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would




 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
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provision designed to protect the investing public from unfair and fraudulent bus-
iness practices. 9 The SEC has used rule 10b-5 to deter insider trading of securities, 19
a practice considered harmful to the securities markets." Insider trading occurs when
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1969): Congress intended rule 10b-5 to be, in the words of one of its draftsmen, a
"catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202
(quoting Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986
(1976). Rule 10b-5 has evolved over the years into the principal limitation on trading on the basis
of material, nonpublic information. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading 4
(Discussion Draft 1984) (available in the St. Louis University Law School Library) [hereinafter Task
Force Reports. The elements of a cause of action under rule 10b-5 generally have been held to be
the following: (1) a misrepresentation, omission, or other fraudulent device; (2) in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities; (3) scienter by the defendant in making the misrepresentation or
omission; (4) materiality of the misrepresentation or omission; (5) justifiable reliance on the fraud-
ulent device (except in SEC and criminal actions); and (6) damages resulting from the fraudulent
device (except in SEC and criminal actions). Id. at 9. Although § 10(b) does not expressly create a
private right of action, courts have implied private actions under rule lOb-5 since 1946. Kardon v.
Nat'l Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1946). In addition, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
held that an implied private right of action exists under this section. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
L° See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982). Insider trading refers to the purchase and sale of securities on the basis
of material, nonpublic information, without disclosure of this information to the other party. See
generally N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES
MARKETS 91l 2.14-2.16 (1977). Section 10(b), although used by the SEC to limit insider trading, is
not directed specifically at insider trading. The only provision that directly regulates trading by
insiders is § 16 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § '78p (1982). Section 16 imposes certain reporting
requirements and trading restrictions upon a defined category of insiders. Task Force Report, supra
note 9, at 52. Section 16 has limited impact on most insider trading, however, because it applies
only when both purchases and sales are made within six months of each other and extends only to
officers, directors, and persons who own more than 10% of a corporation's outstanding securities.
Id. at 8 n.8. For these and other reasons, therefore, the broad antifraud language of § 10(6) has
been used to limit unfair trading activity. Id. at 7-8 & n.8.
The SEC has several enforcement remedies available to enforce rule 106-5 against insider
trading. The most widely used remedy is the authority of the SEC to bring actions in United States
district courts to enjoin violations of rule 106-5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). In addition, the SEC
may transmit any evidence concerning alleged fraudulent conduct to the Attorney General, who
may institute criminal proceedings. Id. See infra note 163 for a discussion of enforcement remedies
available under the 1934 Act.
" See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws,
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 333-39 (1979). Trading on inside information is considered harmful to the
securities market because it allows insiders to manipulate market prices to their own advantage and
the disadvantage of the public. See id. at 330-34. Moreover, insider trading permits insiders to
disserve their corporation and its shareholders by manipulating corporate affairs to affect the price
of the corporate stock. See id. at 335-36. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency that
reported out the bill that eventually became the 1934 Act stated: "[t]he bill further aims to protect
the interests of the public by preventing directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corpo-
ration, the stock of which is traded in on exchanges, from speculating in the stock on the basis of
information not available to others." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), reprinted in I
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an insider, 12 in possession of material, nonpublic information" concerning a corporation,
"tips," recommends, or trades on that information without also disclosing the information
to the public." Under certain circumstances, the outside recipient of the information —
the "tippee"t 5 — also can be held in violation of rule lOb-5 if the tippee trades on the
basis of the inside information without disclosing the information to the other party to
the trade. 16 In situations where the tippee has traded on the basis of the inside infor-
mation to his or her own detriment, a tippee may try to recover his or her losses by
bringing a lawsuit for fraudulent misrepresentation against the tipper.' 7 In such situa-
tions the tipper seeks to use the in pari delicto defense to bar the tippee's suit.
The federal courts have split over whether the in pari delicto defense bars the tippee
from recovery in this situation. A majority of federal courts addressing the issue has
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 716 (1983). One commentator, however, has argued that trading on
inside information is not harmful to the securities market. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET (1966). This commentator claims that insider trading has no discernible impact
on other investors in light of the average trading volume. See id. at 110. Any impact this trading
might have, this commentator argues, performs a useful function by preparing and properly
directing the market before public announcement of the information. See also Lorie, Insider Trading:
Rule 10b -5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 91 LEGAL STUD. 819 (1980) (insider trading
may enhance the efficiency of the market by making prices more accurate); Wu, An Economist Looks
at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 Coum. L. REV. 260 (1968) (insider trading
activity channels additional information to the market which aids fair price determination). It has
been claimed also that insider profits provide an appropriate supplement to executive compensation.
See MANNE, supra, at 138-41. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the SEC have not
accepted the view that insider trading is not harmful to the securities market. See Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (insiders are forbidden from personally using undisclosed corporate infor-
mation to their own advantage or from giving such information to outsiders for personal gain);
H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoNG. & An. NEWS 2274 (insider
trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities market).
' 2 An insider refers to an officer, director, or a controlling stockholder. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 653 (1983) (quoting In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). An insider also may
be a corporate agent, fiduciary, or a "person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their
trust and confidence." Id, at 654 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 230, 232 (1980)).
Under certain circumstances, outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders, "such as where
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation." Id. at 655 n.14.
IS "Material" information refers to any facts that a reasonable investor would consider important
in making a decision to buy or sell a security. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976). "Nonpublic" information refers to information not generally available to ordinary investors
in the marketplace. In re Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971).
' Federal courts have interpreted rule 106-5 as imposing an obligation on corporate insiders
to disclose material inside information prior to trading or to abstain from trading. See Texas Gulf,
401 F.2d at 848; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980) (reviewing admin-
istrative and judicial development of "disclose or abstain" rule). See infra notes 137-60 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the duty to disclose under rule 10b-5.
Is Tippees are "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust." Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Professor Louis Loss coined the word. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3561 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
16 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (tippee's duty to disclose or abstain from trading is derivative from
insider's duty). See infra notes 92-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which
courts held tippees in violation of rule 106-5.
The Third Circuit has stated: "[a] 'tipper' is a person who has possession of material inside
information and who makes selective disclosure of such information for trading or other personal
purposes." Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1154 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977).
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allowed the defense,Ls determining that the voluntary, active participation of the tippee
in the illegal trading scheme renders the tippee in pari delicto with the tipper. 18 In
contrast, other federal courts have disallowed the defense," reasoning that tippees
cannot be as culpable as securities professionals and corporate insiders who disseminated
the inside information and initiated the fraudulent activity. 2 '
In the 1985 case of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,22 the United States
Supreme Court resolved the split among the lower federal courts. The Court disallowed
the in pari delicto defense, ruling that a defendant-tipper may use the defense to bar a
private damages action under the federal securities laws only where the plaintiff-tippee
bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he or she seeks to redress
and preclusion of the suit would not interfere significantly with the effective enforcement
of the securities laws." The Court stated that because a tippee's duty to disclose material
nonpublic information typically is derivative from the insider tipper's duty, the tippee
generally cannot be said to be as culpable as a tipper. 24 Absent other culpable actions,
the Court concluded, the tippee rarely would bear substantially equal responsibility with
the tipper for the violations of rule 10b-5. 26 The Court reasoned that denying the defense
in these situations would best protect the investing public and the national economy by
permitting tippees to bring suit and expose illegal practices by corporate insiders and
broker-dealers. 26
The plaintiffs in Bateman Eichler were a group of investors who purchased large
quantities of over-the-counter stock" of T.O.N.M. Oil and Gas Exploration Corporation
(TONM), which they eventually sold at prices substantially below their purchase price. 28
The investors alleged that Charles Lazzaro, a registered securities broker employed by
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., gave them information which induced them to
18 See, e.g., Tarasi, 555 F.2d 1152; Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enter., 527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 225 (1975);
James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d •700 (5th Cir.
1969); Summerlin v. Blyth Eastman Dillon Sc Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1199,197 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1983); Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, 564 F. Supp.
336 (D.N.J. 1983); In re Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50
F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
19 See, e.g., Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1162;fames, 500 F.2d at 159; Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703; Grumet,
564 F. Supp. at 339; Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. at 178.
"See, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984), aff 'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); Index Fund v. Hagopian, 609 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Schick
v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton, 564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Moholt
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2 ' See, e.g., Berner, 730 F.2d at 1322; Schick, 583 F. Supp. at 848.
22 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
23 id. at 310-11.
24 /d. at 313.
25 1d. at 314.
25 /d. at 315.
27 Stock traded "over-the-counter" refers to stock which is not traded on a stock exchange. L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 674 (1983). Common stock traded solely over-the-
counter generally represents smaller and newer companies than those listed on the stock exchanges.
Id. The over-the-counter market is a decentralized market in which broker-dealers negotiate trans-
actions among broker-dealers and between broker-dealers and customers. Id. at 675-76.
28 Berner, 730 F.2d at 1320.
September 19861	 CASENOTE	 1079
purchase this stock and they subsequently incurred large trading losses. 29 The investors
alleged that the trading losses resulted from a conspiracy by Lazzaro and Leslie Neadeau,
President of TONM, to manipulate the stock price for their own personal gain. 30 Spe-
cifically, Lazzaro allegedly told the plaintiffs that he knew TONM's president personally
and had learned the following nonpublic information: (a) vast amounts of gold had been
discovered in Surinam, and TONM had options in thousands of acres in gold-producing
regions of Surinam, (b) TONM was engaged in negotiations with other companies to
form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese gold, and (c) when this information was
made public, TONM stock would increase from $1.50-3.00 per share to $10-15 per
share. 31 Plaintiffs tried to confirm this information with Neadeau, but Neadeau would
neither confirm nor deny the information. Instead, Neadeau allegedly stated that the
information was not "public knowledge" and that Lazzaro was "very trustworthy and a
good man."32 The plaintiffs purchased TONM stock in late 1979 and early 1980 for
between $1.50 and $3.00 per share, eventually selling it at less than $1.00 per share
when the joint mining venture fell through."
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, charging the defendants with violations of, inter alia, section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule 10b-5. 34 The plaintiffs alleged that
Lazzaro gave them the nonpublic information about TONM stock with knowledge of its
falsity and with the intention of influencing and manipulating the stock of TONM to
enrich himself and Neadeau through commissions and secret profits on purchases and
sales of the stock." The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim, 36 accepting the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' complaint showed that
the plaintiffs were in pari delicto with the defendants and therefore barred from recov-
ery.37
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the complaint. 39 The court held that the doctrine of in pari
delicto does not apply where the plaintiff is less than co-equally responsible for his or
her injury.39 Under the facts presented in the plaintiffs' complaint, the court stated, the
defrauded tippees could not be equally responsible for the injury they suffered as a
result of the fraudulent scheme.° Moreover, the court concluded, the possible threat of
private suits by injured tippees was necessary to deter tippers from knowingly passing
29 Id.
30 Id.
5' Id.' Lazzaro also allegedly told the plaintiffs that after the announcement of the inside
information, TONM shareholders automatically would receive additional stock of a TONM subsid-
iary without the payment of any additional monies. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 302 n.3.
32 Berner, 730 F.2d at 1320.
33 Id.
34 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 301.
"5 Id. at 303 (quoting Complaint 111123, 30, 38). In the alternative, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants made the representations "recklessly with wanton disregard for the truth." Id. at 303
n.5 (quoting Complaint ¶ 32).
56 1d. at 304.
" Berner, 730 F.2d at 1320.
'8 Id.
59 1d. at 1322.
4° Id.
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on false information to the investing public.'] Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that
methods were available to deter the tippee other than outright preclusion of the suit
against the tipper. 42
In a unanimous decision,'" the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit and resolved the split among the circuits, holding that a tipper may use the in
pari delicto defense to bar a tippee's action only where, as a direct result of his or her
own actions, the tippee bears substantially equal responsibility for the violations he or
she seeks to redress and preclusion of the suit would not interfere significantly with the
enforcement of the securities laws:" The Bateman Eichler Court determined that a de-
fendant could not use the in pari delicto defense to bar the plaintiff's suit at this stage
of the litigation because, absent other culpable actions by the tippee, a tippee generally
cannot be equally responsible for violations of rule 10b-5. 46
 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned, denying the defense in such circumstances best promotes the objectives of the
securities laws.46
 The Court stressed the SEC's need to have the tippees' assistance to
expose unlawful conduct of tippers and render them more easily subject to the appro-
priate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties. 47
 Moreover, the Court agreed with
the Ninth Circuit that there were other, more effective means to deter tippees. 48
 Thus,
the Court concluded that permitting defrauded tippees to bring suit would advance the
public interest most frequently. 49
 Therefore, the Court held, courts cannot apply the in
pad delicto defense to bar the plaintiffs' action. 69
Bateman Eichler is important because the Supreme Court resolved the split among
the circuits by allowing tippers, as defendants in private actions under the securities laws,
to raise an in pad delicto defense only in very limited situations. The decision establishes
a two-part test to determine whether the in pad delicto doctrine may be applied to bar
a tippee's suit. In addition, the Bateman Eichler decision is significant because it allows a
plaintiff, without regard to a fiduciary duty or special relationship with the defendant,
to bring an action under rule 10b-5 for misuse of material, nonpublic information. This
result contrasts with the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions to cut back on the
scope of liability under rule 10b-5, thereby limiting the ability of plaintiffs to bring
actions alleging abuses of inside information.'"
" Id. at 1323. The court concluded that securities professionals should not be permitted to
shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudulent misrepresentations. Id. at 1323.
42 Id. at 1324 n.3. Judge Alarcon noted that the availability of suit against the tipper would not
encourage tippees to increase trading; tippees face a difficult burden in succeeding in a private
cause of action under rule 10b-5 because of the requirement to prove scienter, that is, to show that
the tipper possessed an 'intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. In addition, the court noted,
the investor who trades on inside information may subject himself or herself to potential criminal
liability and civil sanctions by the SEC. Id.
43 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. 299 (1985). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court; Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision.
44 /d. at 310-11.
45 Id. at 314
46 1d. at 315.
47 Id. at 315-16.
49
	 at 318.
49 Id. at 319.
50 1d.
51 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (only a relationship of trust and
confidence and not mere possession of inside information creates duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus.
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This casenote examines the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Bateman
Eichler on the availability of the in pari delicto defense in a tippee suit under rule 10b-
5. In Part 1, the casenote presents an overview of the development of the in pari delicto
defense in the area of federal regulatory laws and the scope of rule 10b-5 as defined by
the Court. First, this casenote examines the Court's denial of the defense in the antitrust
area.52 Next, Part I will review lower federal courts' treatment of the defense in private
10h-5 suits. 55 This casenote then will examine the effect of recent Supreme Court
decisions defining the scope of tippee liability. 54 Finally, Part I will consider the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 — a response of the SEC and Congress to the problems
of insider trading. 55
Part II of this casenote takes a closer look at the Court's decision in Bateman Eichler. 56
The final section analyzes the decision of the Court in Bateman Eichler and considers the
effect the decision will have on insider trading. 57 This casenote concludes that the Court's
analysis, which effectively limits the use of the in pari delicto doctrine in the federal
securities area, is the correct approach to the problem of how best to deter insider
trading.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN PAR! DELICTO DEFENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL
REGULATORY LAW
The statutory and judicial background of Bateman Eichler reflects the concern of
both Congress and the courts regarding the problem of insider trading. Federal courts
responded to the problem of insider trading by differing over the effectiveness of the
in pari delicto defense in private actions brought under the federal securities laws.
Looking to decisions in the antitrust area where the Supreme Court had rejected the
defense," several federal courts denied the defense to tippers, holding that corporate
insiders and securities professionals should not be shielded from the consequences of
their unlawful behavior." In contrast, other courts upheld the in pari delicto defense,
reasoning that the voluntary participation of tippees rendered them equally culpable
with the defendant tippers."
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (private action under rule 1013-5 will not lie for mere breach of
fiduciary duty without deception or manipulation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(allegations of negligence insufficient to state a cause of action for damages under rule 106-5), reh'g
denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (only purchasers
or sellers of securities have standing to sue in private action for damages under rule 10b-5), reh'g
denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). See generally Gilbert, Proving a Securities Fraud Case After the Recent
Supreme Court Decisions: Will the Implied Cause of Action Survive!, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 835 (1983)
(discussing recent decisions which have made recovery in implied civil actions under the federal
securities laws more difficult).
52 See infra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 92-136 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 161-80 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 182-221 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 222-284 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Keifer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
55 See, e.g., Berner, 731 F.2d at 1323; Index Fund, 609 F.2d at 507; Moholt, 478 F. Supp. at 453.
6° See, e.g., Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1162-63; Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703-05; Crumet, 564 F. Supp. at
341; Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. at 180.
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Recent decisions by the Supreme Court in the federal securities area, however,
narrowed the availability of the in pari delicto defense by limiting the scope of tippee
liability under rule 10b-5.6 ' The Court rejected the theory that a tippee had a duty to
disclose information or refrain from trading because of "mere possession" of inside
information,62 holding instead that a tippee inherited only a "derivative" duty to disclose
after a corporate insider had breached a fiduciary duty." Congress reacted to this judicial
narrowing of the scope of 10b-5 liability by enacting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, which was designed to deter insider trading through increased SEC sanctions."
The scope of liability under the 1984 Act is broader than the judicial scope of liability
under rule 10b-5, expressing congressional concern over the increasingly widespread
problem of insider trading. 66 The four subsections of Part I of the casenote more closely
examine this judicial and statutory background to the Bateman Eichler decision.
A. In Pari Delicto in Private Antitrust Actions Under Federal Regulatory Schemes: Perma
Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp.
The doctrine of in pari delicto traditionally involved purely common-law disputes
between private individuals." Defendants also have used this doctrine, however, in suits
brought by plaintiffs under federal regulatory schemes governing commerce and fi-
nance.67 Courts have found the doctrine difficult to apply in the latter context, however,
because federal regulatory schemes generally are designed specifically to protect injured
plaintiffs."
61 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
62 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
fig Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
64 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
65 See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. & An. NEWS
2274.
66 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225, 226 (5th Cir.), denying reh'g to 515 F.2d 591 (1975).
67 See, e.g., Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (in pari delicto
defense not available when plaintiff engaged in unrelated antitrust violation); Silverberg v. Paine,
Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1983) (in pari delicto defense not available
when plaintiff not shown to engage in illegal activity under federal securities laws); Mullis v. Bankers
Trust, 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980) (in pari delicto defense not available when plaintiff's alleged
violations were unrelated to rule 10b-5 violations at issue); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th
Cir. 1978) (in pari delicto doctrine not available in action for selling unregistered securities); Gordon
v. DuPont Glore Forgan, 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973) (defense available in action for violation of
stock margin rules when customer knows account is undermargined and takes no corrective action),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Pearlstein v. Scudder Sc German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir, 1970) (in
pari delicto defense not available when customer not equally responsible with broker for violating
margin requirements); Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.) (in pari delicto
defense not available when plaintiff subjected to economic coercion in antitrust violation), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960); Pennsylvania Water & Power v. Consolidated Gas Sc Elec. Light Sc
Power, 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953) (defense of in pari delicto available when plaintiff voluntarily
entered into illegal antitrust agreement and acted under it for seventeen years); Serzysko v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in pari delicto defense bars plaintiff's recovery
because of plaintiff's active deception in violation of Regulation U), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg., 209 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (in
pari delicto defense applicable when plaintiff instigated illegal agreement), aff'd per curium, 327
F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964).
68 Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Weitzman court stated:
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In the 1968 case of Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., the United States
Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine in antitrust
litigation.69 The Court rejected the in pari delicto defense° in a private action brought
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts." In separate opinions, however, five Justices
agreed that the defense should be available in limited situations, 72 such as where a
plaintiff bore at least substantially equal responsibility for the violation." Faced with the
several opinions in Perma Life, lower courts had difficulty in determining the scope of
the in pari delicto defense," as well as its applicability to federal statutes outside the
antitrust area." In the context of federal securities laws, several courts relied heavily on
the analytical framework set out by the Perma Life concurrences to determine the ap-
propriateness of the in pari delicto defense," while other courts sought to distinguish
the Perna Life holding and restrict its reasoning solely to antitrust litigation."
In Perma Life, franchised operators of "Midas Muffler" shops sued the franchisor,
its parent corporation, two other subsidiaries, and six officers or agents of the corporation
for treble damages, claiming that certain provisions of the Midas franchise sales agree-
Over the years, this notion [equal participation in the illegal act] has proved simple
enough in application in purely private disputes between private parties. However,
the legislative adoption of comprehensive regulatory schemes, such as the federal
securities laws, designed in part for the very purpose of aiding and protecting the
injured plaintiffs, has complicated matters.
Id.
69 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968).
79 Id. at 140.
" Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (prohibits conspiracies which unreasonably restrain
trade); Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) (prohibits agreements to lessen competition). The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade and lessen com-
petition. 392 U.S. at 135. The plaintiffs also alleged price discrimination violating § 2(a) of the
Clayton Act, amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
72 See 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring); id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 149
(Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 153 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The other Justices did not preclude the defense but stated, "[w]e need not
decide ... whether ... truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme
could ever be a basis ... for barring a plaintiff's cause of action ...." Id. at 140 (Black, J., joined
by Warren, C.J., Douglas and Brennan, JJ.) (opinion of the Court).
" See id. at 146 (White, J., concurring) ("1 would deny recovery where a plaintiff and defendant
bear substantially equal responsibility for the injury resulting to one of them ...."); id. at 147
(Fortas, J., concurring) ("If the fault of the parties is reasonably within the same scale ... then the
doctrine should bar recovery."); id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("1 would hold that where a
defendant ... can show the plaintiff actively participated in the formation and implementation of
an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at fault, the plaintiff should be barred from imposing
liability on the defendant."); id. at 154 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("When a person suffers losses as a result of activities the law forbade him to
engage in, I see no reason why the law should award him treble damages from his fellow offenders.")
(emphasis in original).
74 See, e.g., Handler & Sacks, supra note 3, at 1141-52 (discussing lower court interpretations
of in pari delicto doctrine after Parma Life).
" Id. at 1143-48. See also Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delia° in Private Actions Pursuant to
Federal Regulatory Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 572, 579-95 (1972) (discussing application of Parma
Life CO securities laws).
76 See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977).
77 See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ment violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 78 The
defendants contended that because the plaintiffs furthered and supported a monopolistic
scheme, the in pari delicto doctrine should bar them from bringing suit. 22 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Black, appeared to reject the in pari delicto
doctrine as an antitrust defense.° Although the Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs
may be no less "morally reprehensible" than the defendants, it nonetheless concluded
that the deterrent threat posed by private actions under the antitrust laws was necessary
to further the overriding public policy favoring competition. 81
Despite rejecting the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense in antitrust actions for
policy reasons, Justice Black's opinion for the Court analyzed the relative fault of the
parties, concluding that even if the defense did exist, the facts in this case would not
support it. 82
 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were less responsible than the
defendants for their own injuries because the plaintiffs did not actively support and
further the monopolistic scheme." Instead, the Court concluded, the plaintiffs were
forced to acquiesce in the agreement solely to obtain an otherwise attractive business
opportunity." The Court should not use this acquiescence, the Court stated, as a ground
for completely denying the right to recovery under the antitrust laws."
Although all of the Justices agreed with the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not
equally responsible with the defendants, 86
 at least five Justices stated in separate opinions
that the in pari delicto defense still exists when a plaintiff equally and voluntarily
participates in the misconduct. 87
 Justices White and Marshall believed that allowing treble
damage recovery to a plaintiff who actively participated in the formulation and imple-
mentation of an illegal scheme would encourage, rather than deter, violations of the
antitrust laws. 88
 In such a situation, these Justices agreed, a limited application of the in
78 392 U.S. at 135.
79 1d. at 140.
"
81 Id. at 139. Justice Black cited two earlier private antitrust actions where the Court did not
bar the plaintiffs from recovery even though they participated in the alleged violations: Simpson
v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (dealer whose consignment agreement was cancelled for failure
to adhere to a fixed resale price could bring suit although he signed the agreement) and Keifer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (plaintiff not barred from recovery
by proof he had engaged in an unrelated antitrust violation). See generally Handler & Sacks, supra
note 3, at 1131-41 (discussing in pari delicto under antitrust laws prior to Perma Life).
" See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138-140 (dictum).
" See id. at 139-40. Justice Black concluded that the plaintiffs, rather than being active partic-
ipants, had the "illegal scheme ... thrust upon them by Midas." Id. at 141.
84 Id. at 139.
85 Id. at 140.
86 Id. at 147 (White, J., concurring) ("The evidence before us does not suggest that the peti-
tioners were equal partners with respondents"); id. at 148 (Fortas, J., concurring) ("Clearly, peti-
tioners here are not co-adventurers or partners"); id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he
record is replete with evidence ... which indicates ... that the petitioners did not actively seek out
or support all the anticompetitive restraints embodied in the franchise."); id. at 156 (Harlan, J.,
joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("1 would remand this case to
determine whether any agreement alleged to be in restraint of trade was one for which the plaintiffs
were substantially as much responsible ... as the defendants.").
87 See supra note 73 (quoting Justices' conclusions regarding situations where in pari delico
defense should be applied).
"See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring); id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice White noted that "by insuring [the plaintiff] illegal profits if the agreement in restraint of
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pari delicto defense was both proper and desirable to deter violations of the antitrust
laws."
In summary, the Court appeared to reject the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense
in antitrust actions. The concurring opinions, however, acknowledged the Justices' con-
cern with the conflict between a wrongdoer using the courts "to profit through his own
wrongdoing"90 and the strong public interest in deterring potential violators of the
antitrust laws. The lack of a clear majority holding on the appropriate role of the in pari
delicto defense in antitrust actions subsequently caused confusion in federal courts which
analyzed the in pari delicto defense in the context of the federal securities laws."
B. In Pari Delicto Defense in 106 -5 Actions in Federal Courts
Innocent plaintiffs who either purchased securities from or sold them to insiders
who enjoyed the benefit of special information not available to the general public ordi-
narily bring private rule 10b-5 suits. 92 Ina tippee suit, however, the plaintiff is a tippee
who also possesses inside information that the insider-tipper has revealed." Although
lower federal courts have been uncertain of the scope of the tippee's liability under rule
10b-5, courts before 1980 generally assumed tippees were under the same affirmative
duty as insiders to disclose the inside information or refrain from trading." Therefore,
a tippee's failure to disclose the inside information before trading placed the tippee as
well as the tipper in violation of rule 10b-5." Seeking to foreclose recovery in a suit
against the tipper brought by the tippee, the tipper asserted the defense of in pari
delicto. Federal courts looked to the several opinions in Perma Life, in the antitrust
context, to determine the appropriateness of the defense in the context of the federal
securities laws. Not surprisingly, they disagreed on whether defendants could successfully
use the doctrine to bar plaintiffs' recovery in such tippee 10b-5 suits.
The first case addressing the in pari delicto doctrine in a tippee rule 10b-5 action
was the 1969 case of Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation, where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the defense." The court held, over a strong
dissent,97 that the plaintiff's failure to disclose inside information before trading ren-
trade succeeds, and treble damages if it fails, it may encourage what the Act was designed to
prevent." Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
8g Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., concurring).
9 Compare, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.) (court construed Perma
Life as requiring an analysis of the parties' relative responsibility for the violations and the effect of
the result on the enforcement of the regulatory scheme), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977), with
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court construed Perrna
Life as requiring the court to focus on what effect the result would have on protection of the
investing public, notwithstanding the plaintiff's illegal conduct).
52 See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff 'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
93 See, e.g., Ross, 263 F. Supp. at 410.
94 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Supreme Court decisions establishing the scope of tippee liability under rule 10b-5 after 1980.
95 See id.
"412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969).
97 Id. at 705 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
1086	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:1075
dered him in pari delicto with the defendant and barred his recovery from the insider."
In Kuehnert, the plaintiff received inside information from the President of Texstar
Corporation concerning an alleged acquisition which would result in increased dividends
and an increased stock value." When the representation turned out to be false, the
plaintiff lost his entire investment.'w
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, notwithstanding the falsity of the information, the
plaintiff (the tippee) believed he had a duty to disclose, yet he attempted to take wrongful
advantage of his tip.'" Thus, the court stated, he willingly agreed to participate in an
illegal scheme and accordingly, the in pari delicto defense barred his recovery. 01 2 I n
reaching this conclusion, the Kuehnert court distinguished the Supreme Court's holding
in Perma Life'" by restricting that holding to the antitrust area.'" The Kuehnert court
noted that the degree of public interest in antitrust suits was greater than in private SEC
violations between two individuals.'" Furthermore, the court stated, the plaintiff actively
and voluntarily participated in the wrongdoings, in contrast to an antitrust action where
there may be economic duress and unequal bargaining power among parties.' 06 Regard-
less of the relative fault of the parties, the court declared, the pivotal question whether
to apply the in pari delicto defense turned on whether doing so would increase the
protection of the investing public.'" The court concluded that the defense should be
available to defendants in lOb-5 tippee actions to provide some deterrent effect on the
activities of tippees and avoid the dangers of creating an enforceable warranty for the
tippees against false information.'" Moreover, the Fifth Circuit observed, corporate
insiders already faced substantial deterrent pressures on their conduct.'"
During the early 1970's, most courts followed the decision of the Kuehnert court and
allowed, the use of the in pari delicto defense in 10b-5 suits."° In 1977, in Tarasi v.
It Id. at 702.
"Id.
IC* Id.
101 Id. at 703. The plaintiff argued that because the inside information he received was false,
he concealed nothing from his vendors. Id. The court rejected this argument, noting that regardless
of whether the fraud was successful or only an attempt, "the statutory phrase 'any manipulative or
deceptive device,' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) seems broad enough to encompass [such] conduct." Id. at 704.
102 Id. at 703.
' 05 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
104 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
103
1 " Id. at 703-04.
, O 7 Id. at 704.
108 Id. at 705. The court stated that if the 'Court denied the defense to the tipper, the tippee
would have "an enforceable warranty that [the] secret information is true. It is then he that will
have free rein. If what he is told is false, he can recover against his informer." Id. In contrast, the
dissent in Kuehnert urged that the best way to stop misuse of confidential information was to place
maximum pressure on the source of the information the tipper — to discourage the initial
disclosure of the information. Id. at 706 (Godbold,,[., dissenting).
109 Id. at 705. The dissent argued, however, that the in pail delicto defense should not bar the
tippees' suit because private suits under rule 10b-5 are a major weapon in attaining the objectives
of the federal securities laws. Id. at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
110
 Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enter., 527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (submission of in
pari delicto defense to the jury is warranted against claims asserted by culpable participants); James
v. DuBreuit, 5Q0 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974) (in pari dam defense bars plaintiff's action where
plaintiff had participated with defendant in fraudulent transaction with intent to violate the secu-
rities laws); In re Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (doctrine of in pari delicto bars
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Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
the in pari delicto defense." In contrast to the Kuehnert court, however, the Third
Circuit relied on the analytical framework set out in the separate concurrences in Perma
Life to uphold the in pari delicto defense." 2 The plaintiffs in Tarasi alleged that the
defendant, an officer of the Pittsburgh National Bank, gave them inside information
about a proposed merger involving clients of the bank." 3 When the merger failed to
materialize, the value of the plaintiffs' stock declined from eight dollars per share to one
dollar per share." 4 The Tarasi court interpreted the Perma Life concurring opinions as
requiring a two-part analysis to determine the appropriateness of the in pari delicto
doctrine in private suits under federal regulatory statutes. 115 First, the court found, the
plaintiffs' unlawful conduct must be active and significant before it can bar recovery,
and if so, then the court must assess carefully the impact that denying recovery would
have on the enforcement of statutory schemes." 6 The court found that in a tippee-tipper
situation, the plaintiffs' voluntary and willing participation in the illegal scheme differs
significantly from the "passive and perhaps coerced" participation by plaintiffs in an
antitrust action. 17 The court noted that the voluntary illegal activities of the plaintiffs
presented a serious threat to the investing public."'" Moreover, the Third Circuit ob-
served, the plaintiffs would not have suffered any injury but for the fact they violated
the securities laws by purchasing stock on the basis of inside information.' 19 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' conduct warranted application of the in pari delicto de-
fense.' 2 °
Turning to the policy issue of enforcement of the securities laws, the Tarasi court
reasoned that allowing tippee recovery by eliminating the defense would result in only
"incremental deterrence" of the tipper violations because the threat of tippee suits against
tippers was questionable. 121 This slight deterrent effect, the court stated, would be
tippees from bringing suit under rule 10b-5); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(court should not strike affirmative defense of in part delicto on pretrial motion because the defense
raises serious and substantial legal issues). Cf. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.)
(in pari delicto defense, although not applicable on the facts of this case, is available in actions
arising under the securities laws), reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 225 (1976). But see Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Stipp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (although plaintiffs' actions violated rule
10b-5, defense of in pari delicto not available because private suits are necessary to promote the
securities laws).
"' 555 F.2d 1152, 1162 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
"2 /d. at 1161-62.
'" Id. at 1154-56. The plaintiffs alleged that they purchased stock of Meridian Industries on
information given to them by the defendant concerning a proposed merger between Meridian
Industries and Paragon Plastics. Specifically, the defendant allegedly told the plaintiffs that the
common stock of Meridian, which was then selling at eight dollars per share, would double in price
because of the planned merger. Id. at 1154.
"4 /d. at 1154, 1156.
" 5 1d. at 1158-59.
116 Id.
" 7 Id. at 1161-62.
"8 Id. at 1162.
"9 1d.
' 2° Id.
121 1d. at 1163. The court noted that because tippees would have to show scienter as a prereq-
uisite to recovery under rule 10b-5, it was uncertain whether the threat of tippee suits would
forestall tippers from spreading inside information. Id.
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outweighed by the increase in tippee trading that would result from creating a warranty
for tippees by eliminating the defense. 122 Moreover, the court observed, the possibility
of SEC and criminal actions and private suits by non-tippee purchasers and sellers already
discouraged tippers from releasing inside information.'" Finally, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that where enforcement concerns are equally balanced, the court may consider
the traditional rationale for imposing the in pari delicto defense — that wrongdoers
should not be permitted to profit through their own wrongdoings. 129
In contrast to the decisions upholding the in pari delicto defense by the Kuehnert
and Tarasi courts, the United States Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the in pari delicto defense, holding that the defense was not available
to the defendant against tippees who claimed damages from reliance on false inside
information.' 28 In Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon Inc., the court focused on the effect
that allowance or disallowance of the defense would have on protecting the investing
public, rather than on the relative fault of the parties."8 The plaintiffs in Nathanson
purchased stock of TST Industries based on a merger "tip" they received from the
defendant, a brokerage firm that owned controlling shares in the merging corpora-
tions. 127 The merger took place, but the terms were different from those that the
defendant had represented to the plaintiffs, who took a substantial loss. 128 In denying
the defense, the court asserted that the insider or broker-dealer, as the source of the
confidential information, presented a greater potential threat than the tippee to under-
mining the statutory protection intended for the public investor because he or she was
in a position to disclose information selectively. 128 The most effective way to discourage
dissemination of inside information, the district court reasoned, was to place maximum
pressure on tippers by making the in pari delicto defense unavailable to them.'"
Federal courts which disallowed the defense after Nathanson generally focused on
the relative fault of the parties, concluding that in tippee-tipper situations the parties
were not equally at fault. In one case the court found the facts were unclear as to whether
the plaintiff understood and knowingly engaged in the illegal act of using inside infor-
mation."' Another court held that investors could not be as culpable as brokers because
brokers are "quasi-fiduciaries" and should be held to a high degree of "trustworthiness
and fair dealing. ”132
122 Id.
' 23 Id. at 1164.
124 Id.
'" Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
156 1d. at 52-53.
' 27 Id. at 51.
In Id. at 52. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant made false and misleading statements
regarding the exchange ratio at the time of the merger and knew the exchange ratio would not be
as stated when he induced plaintiffs to buy TST Industries common stock. Id. at 51.
' 29 Id. at 57.
' 3° Id. at 57-58.
Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton, 564 F. Supp. 427, 436-37 (ED. Mich. 1983).
' 3 ' Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 478 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.D.C. 1979). See also Berner v.
Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) (tippees could not have been as equally responsible
for their injuries as securities professionals who initiated fraudulent scheme), aff'd sub nom. Bateman
Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); Index Fund v. Hagopian, 609 F. Supp. 499, 506-07
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Other federal courts continued to allow the in pari delicto defense, concluding that
the tippee generally was a voluntary, active, and essential participant in the illegal
activity.'" These courts focused on the effect that denial of the defense would have on
the enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing public) 34 In one
case, the court noted that eliminating the defense would remove the most effective
deterrent of a tippee's use of the information)" Similarly, another court concluded that
permitting the tippee to bring suit actually would encourage improper use of inside
information. 196
In summary, lower federal courts had trouble determining the scope of the Perma
Life decision and analogizing the fault of the tippees and tippers in a 106-5 suit to the
fault of the parties in an antitrust violation. The courts' speculations on the potential
effects that the in pari delicto defense would have on the enforcement of the securities
laws widened the split among the federal courts as to the proper role of the doctrine in
rule 110b -5 actions.
C. The Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b -5
In addition to the confusion resulting from application of the Perma Life opinions,
the changing scope of the insider's duty to disclose inside information and its effect on
the tippee's duty to disclose added to the difficulty in applying the in pari delicto defense
in 10b-5 suits. Prior to 1980, courts assumed that tippees were under the same duty to
disclose material nonpublic information prior to trading as traditional insiders. Courts
applied the "disclose or refrain" rule, holding that a tippee violated rule 10b-5 when the
tippee possessed material, nonpublic information that the tippee knew or should have
known came from a corporate insider and the tippee failed to refrain from trading or
(D.C.N.Y. 1985) (although plaintiffs' agent allegedly accepted a bribe, plaintiffs were not as culpable
as defendants who induced plaintiffs to buy worthless securities).
Courts also disallowed the in pari delicto defense in some cases as a result of the narrowed
scope of the insider's duty to disclose and the uncertainty over the source of the tippee's duty to
disclose. See Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (in pari delicto defense not
available when tippee not shown to violate rule 106-5 in the absence of a duty to disclose inside
information or refrain from trading); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882
(S.D. Fla. 1981) (in pari delicto defense not available because the plaintiff could not be characterized
as a tippee in violation of rule 106-5 in the absence of any facts establishing the defendant as an
insider); Kulla v. E.F. Hutton, 426 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (tippee did not violate
rule 106-5 in a situation where the tipper was not shown to be a corporate insider and hence, the
in pari delicto defense did not preclude the tippee from pursuing a legal remedy against the tipper).
But see Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983) (in pari delicto
defense should be available, regardless of whether the tipper is an insider, to discourage improper
use of inside information by tippees). See infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text discussing the
duty to disclose under rule 1013-5.
"'See, e.g., Summerlin v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon Sc Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1199,197 at 95,793 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1983).
154 See, e.g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981);
Summerlin, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1199,197 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23,
1983); Grumet, 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983); In re Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
155 Haven /lulus., 462 F. Supp. at 180.
11° Grunter, 564 F. Supp. at 341.
1090	 BOSTON C01.I.FGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 27:1075
disclose the information before trading)." The tippee's violation of rule 10b-5 gave the
tipper the opportunity to raise the in pari delicto defense and claim the tippee was
substantially equally at fault for the alleged damages and, therefore, should be barred
from recovery.'"
In the 1980 decision of Chiarella v. United States, however, the United States Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of an insider's duty to disclose material, nonpublic information
prior to trading.'" As a result, the scope of a tippee's duty to disclose under rule 10b-5
also narrowed,H° making it more difficult to find a tippee in violation of rule 10b-5.
This narrowed scope of tippee liability, in turn, limited the situations where a tipper
could assert the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense to bar the tippee's private damages
action . 141
In Chiarella, the Court rejected the theory that a duty to disclose under section 10(b)
arose from mere possession of nonpublic information. 142
 Instead, the Court concluded
that a duty to disclose arose when one party was entitled to know the inside information
held by the other party because of a fiduciary or other similar relationship between
them. 145
 Accordingly, the Court reasoned, a trader in stock has no duty to reveal inside
information to a prospective vendor if the trader is neither an insider nor a fiduciary.' 44
The Chiarella Court addressed the issue of tippee liability briefly in a footnote, where it
157
	 e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas Gulf, the court concluded that the duty to disclose
inside information prior to trading was "also applicable to one possessing the information who may
not strictly be termed an 'insider.'" Id. The first extension of rule 10b-5 liability to persons not
usually considered insiders occurred in In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady,
the SEC held that the duty to disclose material nonpublic information arose from the existence of
a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for corporate
purposes and the unfairness of allowing a person in a special relationship to the insider to take
advantage of this information by trading without disclosure. Id. at 912. See also Shapiro v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 236-38 (2d Cir. 1974) (Second Circuit imposed duty
on tippees to disclose material inside information before trading); In re Investors Management Co.,
Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971) (SEC held that a duty is imposed on a tippee when the following
elements exist: (a) The tippee possesses information which is material and nonpublic; (b) the tippee
knew or had reason to know that the tipper selectively revealed or otherwise improperly disclosed
the information; and (c) the information was a factor in the tippee decision to trade).
'" See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F,2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
'" 445 U.S. 222, 233-35 (1980).
' 4° In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts assumed that the scope
of a tippee's duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 was the same as an insider-tipper's duty to disclose,
and thus the tippee's duty to disclose narrowed with the narrowing of the insider's duty to disclose.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 132 and accompanying text for rule 10b-5 cases where courts refused to
apply the.
 in pari delicto defense due to the narrowed scope of tippee liability after Chiarella.
142 445 U.S. at 235.
"5 Id. at 228.
' 44 Id. at 229. In Chiarella, the defendant worked for a New York financial printer who printed
corporate takeover bid announcements. Id. at 224. Chiarella was able to gather information before
the final printing of the takeover bids, use this information to purchase shares of the target
companies' stock before the information was released, and later sell the stock for large profits once
the information became public. Id. The Court held that Chiarella had no duty to reveal this
information because he had no special relationship with the selling shareholders: "[hie was not
their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust
and confidence." Id, at 232.
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noted that a tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his or her role after the
fact in a tipper's breach of a fiduciary duty. 145
The Supreme Court relied in part on this observation of the nature of tippee liability
under rule 10b-5 in its decision three years later in Dirks v. SEC. 146 The Dirks Court held
that tippees assume a fiduciary duty to disclose or refrain only when there has been a
showing that the insider tippers have breached their own duty by deriving a personal
benefit from the disclosure and the tippees know or should know that the breach
occurred. 147 Thus, the Court concluded, a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain "is deriv-
ative from that of the insider's duty. "148
In Dirks, Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding Corporation of America
(EFCA), gave information to Raymond Dirks, a noted investment analyst, alleging a
massive fraud at EFCA and urging Dirks to expose it. 149 Prior to exposing the fraud,
however, Dirks discussed the information with several clients who had large holdings in
EFCA. The clients subsequently sold approximately $16 million in EFCA stock, thereby
causing a rapid and dramatic drop in the market value of the EFCA stock.' 5° In an
administrative hearing, the SEC found Dirks guilty of aiding and abetting violations of
rule 106-5.' 5 '
The Supreme Court reversed Dirks' conviction." The Court held that Dirks, as a
tippee of material inside information, had no duty to abstain from using the inside
information because the insider tipper from whom he received the information had not
breached his duties to shareholders.'" The Court emphasized the requirement of a
specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on the infor-
mation.'" The Court rejected the theory that a tip pee "inherits" a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders whenever the tippee receives inside information. 155 The Court stated that
145 1d. at 230 n.12.
'46 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
147 Id. at 660.
'45 Id. at 659.
14g Id. at 648-49.
150 Id. at 649-50.
' 5 ' Id. at 650-51. An administrative law judge found Dirks guilty of aiding and abetting
violations of rule 10b-5. See In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,812
at 83,941 ( Jan. 22, 1981). Upon appeal, the SEC reduced the sanction imposed on Dirks from a
60-day suspension to censure, in light of his role in exposing the massive fraud at EFCA. See id. at
83,950. Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 652. The court entered judgment against Dirks based on the reasons stated by the SEC in its
opinion. Id.
'" Id.
1 " Id. at 667. The Court held that Secrist and other EFCA employees did not violate their
fiduciary duty to the shareholders because they revealed the information in order to expose the
fraud and not to benefit monetarily or personally. Id. at 666-67. The dissent argued, however, that
adding a special motivational requirement to the insider's fiduciary duty was not justified, because
the shareholder's injury caused by the dissemination of inside information by the insider remains
the same regardless of the insider's motivation. Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). By adding this
improper purpose requirement to the insider's fiduciary duty, the dissent argued, the Court limited
the investing public's protection under § 10(b). Id. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 655. The Court also noted that "[u]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working
for a corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders." Id. at 655 n.14.
155 Id. at 655-56.
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this theory of tippee liability was based on the erroneous idea that the antifraud provi-
sions require equal information among all traders.'" A legal duty to disclose information,
the Court reasoned, arose from the relationship of the parties and not merely from a
person's ability to acquire information because of his or her position in the market.' 57
Dirks made it more difficult to find a tippee in violation of rule 10b-5. The duty to
disclose does not attach to a tippee unless the insider tipper has breached a fiduciary
duty to shareholders by disclosing information to the tippee for reasons of personal
benefit and the tippee knew or should have known the breach occurred.'" Only if these
conditions are met does a tippee violate rule 10b-5 by trading on the basis of inside
information without disclosure. Thus, after Dirks, it became more difficult for the de-
fendant-tipper to show that the plaintiff-tippee also violated the same statutory provisions
under which the plaintiff sought recovery. 159 Moreover, even if the plaintiff also violated
the statutory provision, it became more difficult for the defendant to show that the
plaintiff's fault was equal to the defendant's fault, because the tippee's duty to disclose
arose only after the fact of the insider's breach of fiduciary duties.' 60 The Dirks decision
thus appeared to limit the effectiveness of the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense
available to tippers in actions brought against them by tippees.
D. Legislative Response to Insider Trading — The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
Despite the SEC's increased enforcement efforts,' 61 insider trading continued to
increase during the late 1970's and early 1980's, exacerbated by the increased activity in
' SS Id. at 657.
157 Id. at 657-58. The Court acknowledged that Idlepending on the circumstances, ... one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior which may fall below ethical standards of
conduct." Id. at 661 n.21. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that in a statutory area of law such
as securities regulation, there are significant distinctions between legal obligations and ethical ideals.
Id.
158 1d. at 660-62.
159 The common-law defense of in pari delicto is available only where a plaintiff participated
equally with the defendant in the specific illegal behavior that is the subject of the plaintiff's suit.
See supra notes 2 and 3 discusSing the in pari delicto defense.
16° See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-60. See also Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in
Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions After Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 519, 538-43 (1984) (discussing
difficulties tippers face in proving tippees violated rule 106-5 after Dirks) [hereinafter Note, Avail-
ability of Defense]. The Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks also restrict the ability of a non-tippee
plaintiff to bring suit under rule 1013-5. A non-tippee plaintiff has no cause of action against a party
who traded on the basis of material nonpublic information in the absence of a duty to disclose to
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court imposed a duty to disclose on corporate insiders and other
persons who are in a relationship of trust and confidence with the issuer or seller of the securities.
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. See also Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d
5, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)) (plaintiffs could not
maintain cause of action where defendants owed no duty of disclosure to the plaintiff), cert. denied
sub nom. Moss v, Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). Moreover, under Dirks, the insider or fiduciary
must disclose the inside information for the improper purpose of personal gain before the Court
considers the duty breached. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
161 See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1982, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) (SEC has brought
over fifty insider trading cases since 1978, compared to forty cases brought between 1942 and 1978)
[hereinafter SEC Memorandum]. As of Feb. 1984, the SEC had brought over 120 enforcement
actions alleging violations of the insider trading proscriptions. Lynch, The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: New Remedies for the SEC, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 166 (1984). The SEC brought more cases
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mergers and tender offers, the growth of the options market, and the increased volume
of trading in the securities market generally. I fi2 By 1984, the SEC felt strongly that the
enforcement remedies available under the 1934 Act' 63 were inadequate to deter insider
trading. ' 64 In an attempt to respond to the increasingly widespread problem of insider
trading, 168 the SEC proposed legislation in 1982 to increase the remedies available for
violations of the 1934 Act. 166 Congress enacted the SEC's proposal in 1984 as the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act' 67 (1984 Act).
The 1984 Act authorizes the SEC to seek civil penalties of up to three times the
amount of profit gained, or loss avoided, by a person who violated the federal securities
laws by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation. 168 Courts also may impose this penalty upon tippers who aid and abet violations
during the four years preceeding 1983 than in all the previous years combined. H.R. REP. No. 355,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONC. & An. NEWS 2274 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
162 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 5; see generally Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading
Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. I (1980) (discussing incidence of insider trading and effectiveness of
enforcement remedies).
168 See 15 U.S.C. I 78u(d) (1982) (SEC can seek injunctions against violations); id. at § 780-3(h)
(SEC can discipline broker-dealers who violate 1934 Act); id. at § 78u(a) (SEC can investigate insider
trading violations and publish findings). The 1934 Act subjects violators to possible criminal fines
of up to $10,000 and maximum five-year prison terms for "willful" violations of the 1934 Act. See
id. at § 78ff(a) (criminal penalties). The SEC also can request that the court order certain equitable
remedies such as disgorgement of the illegal profits. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335
(5th Cir. 1978) (disgorgement deprives wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (disgorgement is a method of forcing defendant to surrender
unjust enrichment).
' 64 SEC Memorandum, supra note 161, at 24. The SEC considers the injunctive remedy inad-
equate to deter insider trading because it merely requires the defendant to comply with the law,
and as such, presents no significant hardship. Id. The SEC also considers the disgorgement of illegal
profits inadequate because it simply restores a defendant to his or her original position without
extracting a penalty for his or her illegal behavior. Id. In addition, the SEC considers the $10,000
criminal fine inadequate because the effects of inflation have diminished its deterrent impact. Id.
at 26. See SEC v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (court acknowledges inadequacy of
SEC remedies to deter insider trading), rev'd on other grounds, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) ¶ 91,576 (9th Cir. June 29, 1984).
165 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 5. See generally Dooley, supra note 162 (discussing effec-
tiveness of enforcement efforts in regulating insider trading).
' 66 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 8.
' 67 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). President Reagan signed the Act into law on August
10, 1984. The House Report, as amended by Senator D'Amato's floor remarks and as further
amended by floor comments of Representatives Dingell and Broyhill, is the only comprehensive
source of the legislative history. See 130 CONG. REC. S.8912-14 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement
of Sen. D'Amato); 130 CONG. REC. H.7756-60 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statements of Reps. Dingell
and Broyhill). Neither the Senate Banking Committee nor the Senate-House conference prepared
a report. For commentary on the Act, see Brodsky, Insider Trading and the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984: New Wine into New Bottles?, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV, 921, 922 (1984); Freeman, The
Insider Trading Sanctions Bill — A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REV. 221 (1984); Langevoort, The
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAN D. L. REV. 1273 (1984);
Lynch, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act: New Remedies for the SEC, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 166
(1984); Stevenson, Jr., The Insider Trading Sanctions Act: Some Unfinished Business Ahead, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 15, 1984, at 18, col. 1.
' 68 15 U.S.C. § 78u(2)(A)(Supp. II 1984). The 1984 Act leaves the actual amount of the civil
penalty to the discretion of the courts, in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 161, at 8-9.
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by communicating nonpublic information.' 69 In addition, the 1984 Act .increases the
maximum criminal fine for "willful" violations of the 1934 Act from $10,000 to
$100,000.' 7°
Congress intended this expansive scope of liability under the 1984 Act as a response
to the recent judicial decisions, 171 such as Chiarellal" and Dirks,'" that restricted the
scope of liability for rule 10b-5 violations.' 74 The 1984 Act is internally inconsistent,
however, as it appears to both adopt and abandon the existing judicial approach. On
the one hand, the House Report rejected the call for a definition of insider trading
clearly indicating those persons and activities subject to liability under the 1984 Actin
The House Report noted instead that the law with respect to insider trading was suffi-
ciently well developed to provide adequate guidance.' 76 On the other hand, however,
the language of the 1984 Act departs from the restrictive judicial approach to rule 10b-
5 liability in several ways. First, the House Report makes no reference to the Chiarella
requirement that a fiduciary duty or special relationship with the issuer must exist before
the court can find a violation of the federal securities laws. 177 Moreover, in response to
concern over the Dirks decision and its possible adverse effect on the SEC's ability to
pursue insider trading cases, the House Report indicates that the Dirks case involved
"unique facts" and should be "narrowly construed" by the courts so that it does not
adversely affect the SEC's insider trading program. 178 Thus, while the House Report
appears to adopt the existing restrictive judicial approach to rule 10b-5 liability, the
language of the 1984 Act is broadly written to give the SEC added flexibility to reach a
wide range of abuses.' 79
In sum, the straightforward purpose of the 1984 Act was to curb insider trading by
increasing the risks run by persons who engage in this activity. The language of the
169
 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 9.
170 Id. at 12.
171 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (only a relationship of trust and
confidence and not mere possession of inside information creates duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (private action under rule 106-5 will not lie for mere breach of
fiduciary duty without deception or manipulation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(allegations of negligence insufficient to state a cause of action for damages under rule 10b-5), reh'g
denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (only purchasers
or sellers of securities have standing to sue in private action for damages under rule 106-5), reh'g
denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
172 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
175 464 U.S. 646 (1983).
174 See supra notes 139-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's restriction of
the scope of liability for rule 10b-5 violations.
175 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 13-14.
"6 Id. at 13.
177 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty to disclose under
Chiarella. The House Report cited underwriters, investment analysts, lawyers, accountants, financial
printers, government officials, and other persons who learn of material inside information as
persons subject to liability under the Act without regard to their relationship to the issuer. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 161, at 4.
178 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 14-15. Because the Act did not include a definition of
insider trading, the House Report noted that judicial interpretations of Dirks could affect the ability
of the SEC to bring actions alleging violations of rule 10b-5. The House Committee therefore
directed the SEC to monitor the effects of Dirks on the SEC's insider trading program for at least
two years. Id. at 15.
"c' See id. at 8,13.
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legislation, however, does not fit within the judicial guidelines on the scope of liability
under rule 10b-5.'" Thus, in Bateman Eichler v. Berner, 1 e' the Court was faced with
reconciling the language of the 1984 Act and the need for additional deterrence to
insider trading, with the judicially narrowed scope of I011-5 liability and the conflicting
lower court decisions on the availability of the in pari delicto defense in the tippee-tipper
context.
IL THE BATEMAN EICHLER DECISION — A CLOSER LOOK
In Bateman Eichler v. Berner,' 82 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Brennan, affirmed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit.'" by holding that the in
pari delicto defense could not serve as a basis to bar the plaintiff's complaint in an action
brought under the federal securities laws. 184 The Court also defined the limits of the in
pari delicto defense in securities cases.'"
The Court began its analysis by discussing the traditional scope of the common-law
defense of in pari delicto. 186 The defense is grounded on the premise that courts should
not be used to mediate disputes among wrongdoers, the Court stated.'" In addition, the
Court noted, denial of judicial relief to wrongdoers may act as an effective deterrent to
illegal behavior.'" The Court pointed out, however, that the classic formulation of the
in pari delicto defense limited its application only to situations where plaintiffs truly
bore at least substantially equal responsibility for their injury.'" The reason for this
limitation, the Court explained, is the possibility of an "inequality of condition" between
the parties that creates different degrees in their guilt.' 9° Furthermore, the Court stated,
even where plaintiffs are substantially equally at fault, public policy considerations may
preclude the use of the defense. 19 '
After identifying the common-law scope of the in pari delicto defense, the Court
next examined the precedential value of the Perma Life' 92 decision, which had denied
the use of the defense in private antitrust actions.'" Anticipating that the Perma Life
two-step inquiry would not permit the use of the in pari delicto defense, the defendants
attempted to distinguish Perma Life and restrict its holding only to antitrust violations.' 84
The defendants argued that although the antitrust laws expressly provided for private
' 8° See Brodsky, supra note 167, at 938-40.




v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984).
104 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 314.
18' Id. at 310-11.
186 1d. at 306-07.
18' at 306.
"8 1d.
I " Id. at 306-07.
190 Id. at 307. The Court noted that the parties may not be equally at fault because of "an
`inequality of condition' between the parties, ... or a 'confidential relationship between th[em]."'
Id. (quoting 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 942a, at 741 (5th ed. 1941)).
19'Id. The Court noted that the defense frequently was precluded in order to promote public
interests. Id.
102 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See supra notes 69-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Perma
Life.
'" Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 308 (citing Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 140).
' 94 Id. at 309.
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actions — thereby encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws — Congress
did not provide for a private action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 195
 The defen-
dants argued that Congress intended a broader application of common-law defenses to
bar private actions under rule 10b-5.'" The Court, however, concluded that it could
apply the views expressed in the concurring opinions of Perma Life to implied private
actions under the federal securities laws.' 97 The Court disagreed with the defendants'
interpretation of congressional intent, noting that public policy considerations are not
limited to situations where Congress expressly provides for private remedies.'" In any
event, the Court noted, the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consideration
of public policy concerns before the defendants could use the defense to bar the plain-
tiff's suit.'" The Court also rejected the defendants' argument that the securities laws,
by providing a savings provision,200 supported a broader scope for equitable defenses. 2"
The Court noted that courts always have construed equitable defenses narrowly in the
context of the federal securities laws, because Congress intended these laws to rectify
the deficiencies of the available common-law protections in the securities area. 202 Ac-
cordingly, the Court adopted a two-part inquiry derived from Perma Life for determining
when a defendant may use the in pari delicto defense in securities actions: the court will
bar the plaintiff's recovery only if "(1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff
bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and
(2) preclusion of the suit would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement
of the securities laws and protection of the investing public." 2"
After formulating the two-part inquiry to determine if the in pari delicto defense is
available to the defendant, the Court discussed each of the two elements in greater detail.
The Court first addressed the circumstances when, under the first requirement, a plain-
tiff, as a direct result of his or her own actions, bears substantially equal responsibility
for the violations he or she seeks to redress. Proceeding on the assumption that the
plaintiffs in this case had violated section I0(b) and rule I0b-5,2" the Court concluded
that a tippee cannot be characterized as being of substantially equal culpability as a
tipper. 295 In the context of insider trading, the Court stated, the recent decision in Dirks
' 96 Id. Courts imply private actions under rule 10b-5 from § 10(b). Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)).
' 96 Id.




200 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides in relevant part: "Nile
rights and remedies provided... shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that
may exist at law or in equity." Id.
261 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 309.
202 Id. at 310. The Court noted that it consistently has maintained that "common law doctrines
are sometimes of 'questionable pertinence' in applying the securities laws." Id. (citing Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983)).
2" Id. at 310 -11.
204 Id. at 311. The Court acknowledged, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the ques-
tion of the plaintiffs' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Id. at 311
n.21. The Court noted that it was unclear both as to whether the plaintiffs acquired a duty to
disclose and as to the nature of the information on which the plaintiffs traded. Id.
2" Id. at 314.
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v. SEC2{6 made it clear that a tippee's duty to disclose material nonpublic information
was derivative from the insider's duty and arises only after the fact of the insider's breach
of fiduciary duties. 207 Thus, the Court concluded, because a tippee's duty is solely
derivative, the tippee cannot be as culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to
that liability in the first place. 2" 8
 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, a tipper who selec-
tively discloses material nonpublic information commits a potentially broader range of
violations than does a tippee who trades on the basis of that information."g While a
tippee may be guilty of fraud against individual shareholders, a tipper may be guilty not
only of fraud against the individual shareholders, but also of fraud against the issuer
itself and perhaps against the tippee by intentionally conveying false or materially in-
complete information to the tippee.21 ° Therefore, the Court concluded, the allegations
in the complaint that the defendants masterminded this scheme to manipulate the market
in TONM stock for their own personal benefit and used the purchasing plaintiffs as
unwitting dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock, if true, rendered the broker-dealer
and corporate insider far more culpable than the investors- 2 "
The Court next examined the second inquiry: whether denying the in pari delicto
defense best promoted the objectives of the securities laws. The Court concluded that
permitting defrauded tippees to bring suit and expose illegal practices by corporate
insiders and broker-dealers would advance the public interest best. 212 The Court first
noted that barring private actions in tippee-tipper cases would result in a number of
alleged fraudulent practices going undetected because of the difficulty in detecting false
tipping. 2 ' 3 Moreover, the Court stated, the SEC is more likely to maximize deterrence
of insider trading by bringing enforcement pressures to bear upon the sources of such
information — corporate insiders and broker-dealers — because they are more likely to
be advised by counsel and be better informed on the allowable limits of their conduct
than are ordinary investors- 2"
Finally, the Court considered the argument, relied upon by some lower federal
courts which have allowed the in pari delicto defense,215
 that denial of the defense would
create an enforceable warranty for tippees.216 By denying the defense, lower courts
posited, if the inside information were correct, the tippee would reap illegal profits; if
the information were false, the tippee could sue his or her tipper for recovery.217 The
2D6 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See supra notes 146-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Dirks case.
207 Baleman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 313 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1983)). The
Court also noted that the tippee may be liable if he or she otherwise obtains the information illegally




210 Id. at 313-14.
2 " Id. at 314.
212 Id. at 319,
212 Id. at 315. The Court noted that the SEC had advised the Court that the SEC has insufficient
resources to ensure that false tipping does not occur or is consistently discovered without the aid
of exposure by tippee lawsuits. Id. (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 25).
2 " 1d. at 316-17.
215 See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Co; p., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
216 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 317- 18,
217 See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Bateman Eichler Court characterized this theory as overstated for failing to consider other
significant factors which deterred tippee trading and avoided the danger of creating an
enforceable warranty. 213 First, the Court observed, tippees who bring suit against their
tippers to recover damages expose themselves to the threat of substantial civil and
criminal penalties under both rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act and sections 2 and 3 of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.^ 1
 Second, tippees cannot bring a private cause
of action under rule 10b-5 in the absence of showing that the defendants acted with
scienter, that is, an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 22° Thus, only in cases
where tippers have defrauded tippees deliberately can tippees maintain a private suit
for recovery. Therefore, the Court concluded, given the deterrent pressures already
facing tippees, allowing defrauded tippees to bring suit would more effectively expose
the illegal conduct of corporate insiders and broker-dealers and advance the public
interest. 22 t
III. CRITIQUE OF BATEMAN EICHLER
The Bateman Eichler Court faced the difficulty of reconciling the traditional equitable
principles disfavoring recovery by wrongdoers with both the scope of rule 10b-5 liability
and the public policy considerations promoting fairness to and protection of the investing
public. The lower court decisions had divided on the appropriate role of the in pari
delicto defense in achieving these goals.222
 The Bateman Eichler Court concluded that
denial of the defense would best promote the objectives of the securities laws, although
the Court did not reject the defense in all situations. 223
This section of the casenote analyzes the Bateman Eichler decision in two subsections.
First, this section examines the Supreme Court's reasoning in adopting the already
established antitrust test to determine the appropriateness of the in pari delicto defense
in actions arising under the federal securities laws. This section suggests that the Court
correctly analogized actions under the two regulatory schemes. This examination also
demonstrates, however, that although the Court's ruling allows for the possibility of the
in pari delicto defense, the Court's analysis of the two requirements necessary to use the
doctrine limits a successful assertion of the defense by the defendant in a tippee-tipper
suit.
The second subsection analyzes the impact that denial of the in pari delicto defense
will have on the practice of insider trading. Unavailability of the defense to the tipper
should deter insider trading activity because the tipper will face the additional threat of
private suit by tippees. By not eliminating the defense completely, however, the Court's
decision also should deter tippees who instigate fraudulent schemes because these tippees
will not be assured of recovery against their tippers. Thus, the Court's narrowly drawn
2 " Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 318.
2" Id. at 318 & n.32. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act imposes severe civil sanctions, as well
as criminal fines of up to $100,000, on persons who have illegally used inside information. Id. See
supra notes 161-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act.
220 Id. at 318. Scienter refers to a mental state embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
22 1. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 319.
222 See supra notes 92-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lower court decisions
in tippee-tipper suits.
221 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 317.
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scope of the in pari delicto doctrine in the securities area is the better approach to
deterrence of insider trading.
A. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Reasoning in Bateman Eichler
I. Analogy to Antitrust Actions
The Bateman Eichler Court stated that a tippee's own actions may bar a private
damages action brought under the federal securities laws only when the plaintiff-tippee,
as a direct result of the tippee's own actions, bears substantially equal responsibility for
the violations the tippee seeks to redress and preclusion of the suit will not interfere
significantly with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the
investing public.224 The Court derived this two-part test directly from the majority and
concurring opinions of Perma Life, which considered the validity of the in pari delicto
defense in antitrust litigation. 225 Indeed, the Bateman Eichler Court expressly stated that
"the views expressed in Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action under
the federal securities laws. "226
The Bateman Eichler Court was correct in applying Perma Life because the distinctions
between the antitrust and securities laws, emphasized by some lower federal courts
allowing the in pari delicto defense,227 are insignificant. One unimportant distinction
arises because the antitrust laws specifically provide for private actions, 229 while private
actions under the federal securities laws are implied by the courts.229
 Yet this express
versus implied private right of action is a distinction without substance. Private actions
under both the antitrust and the securities laws function as deterrents to business
behavior in violation of the laws. 230
 While Congress did not provide expressly for private
actions, private actions are consistent with the public policy purposes of the securities
224
 Id. at 310-11.
225 The Court in Perma Life emphasized the narrow construction which courts should place on
common-law defenses to federal regulations. 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968). The two-part test does
allow, however, for a limited application of the defense as recognized by the Justices writing in
separate concurring opinions in Perma Life. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
226 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310.
227 See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1969) (significant
differences exist between antitrust laws and federal securities laws). See also Comment, Availability
of An In Part Delicto Defense in Rule 1011-5 Tippee Suits, 77 CoLum. L. REV. 1084, 1091 n.41 (1977)
[hereinafter Comment, Tippee Suits].
228 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section I5(a) provides in relevant part: "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (b) of the section, any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States ...." Id.
229 See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implied private action
recognized under rule 10b-5); Superintendent of Ins. v. Rankers Life and Cas., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(Supreme Court recognizes private right of action implied under section 10(b)).
256 'See Perna Life, 392 U.S. at 139 (private actions under antitrust laws necessary to further the
public policy favoring competition); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87
(1983) (private actions under rule 1013-5 necessary to further the broad remedial purposes of the
securities laws against fraud). See Maclntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement,
7 ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 113-14 (1962) (private actions under antitrust laws reflect legislative intent
to supplement. government enforcement).
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statutes — including protecting investors and providing for a fair and honest market. 231
Moreover, the Supreme Court and the SEC have emphasized the necessary and effective
function that private actions play in achieving these objectives and supplementing gov-
ernment enforcement. 232
 The distinction between an express or implied private action,
therefore, is not significant in light of the common function that private actions play in
promoting the objectives of the federal regulations.
One court also has used the treble damage provision available to antitrust plain-
tiffs,233
 without a similar remedy provided in the securities laws,234
 to distinguish the
antitrust statutes from the federal securities laws. 233
 The Fifth Circuit in Kuehnert sug-
gested that this distinction reflects Congress's intent to encourage private plaintiffs to
bring suits under the antitrust laws, but not under the federal securities laws. 236 This
argument, however, fails to account for at least part of the motivation behind the treble
damage provision: its punitive nature acts as an increased deterrent against repetition
of the offense and as a warning to other potential violators, thus minimizing the potential
plaintiff's risk of retribution from a defendant who is often dealing in the same market. 232
The plaintiff in a private securities action, not facing this same risk, needs no additional
incentive to bring suit. Thus, lack of a treble damage provision in the securities laws is
not sufficient to distinguish the securities laws from the antitrust statutes.
Distinguishing Perma Life from securities litigation on public policy grounds is equally
unpersuasive. The Fifth Circuit in Kuehnert reasoned that the degree of public interest
in private SEC violations is not comparable to the interest in antitrust violations and
therefore, public policy considerations favoring the private suit are not sufficient to
outweigh the need to prevent wrongdoers from benefitting from their illegal conduct. 238
This argument, however, assumes that the public does not benefit from denying the in
pari delicto defense and thereby exposing the defendant's illegal behavior. A tippee's
exposure of the tipper's behavior informs both the SEC and other investors of the
alleged illegal behavior, thereby leading to sanctioning the tipper and consequently,
deterring other potential violators. The private action under the securities laws thus
helps to create a fair and honest securities market, an interest comparable to the public's
interest in fair and open competition under the antitrust laws.
In summary, the lower courts' attempts to dismiss the relevance of the Perma Life
antitrust decision to the securities laws are unpersuasive. Both the antitrust and the
231 Eight policies have been cited as underlying rule 106-5: (1) maintaining free securities
markets; (2) equalizing access to information; (3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing
for disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and
(8) deterring violations while compensating victims. Note, The Tips are for the Taking: The Supreme
Court Limits Third Party Liability in Dirks v. SEC, 12 PE?PERDINE L. REv. 93, 96 n.I5 (1984) (citing 5
A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 §§ 6.01—.09 (2d rev. ed. 1984)).
232
 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (private enforcement
of SEC rules provides a necessary supplement to SEC action), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
2" 15 U.S.C: § 15(a) (1982).
2" 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) provides in relevant part: "[nit) person permitted to maintain a
suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of."
233
	 e.g., Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
226 Id.
2" See Comment, The Demise of In Petri Delia° in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes,
60 CALIF. L. REv. 572, 573 n.6 (1972).
25
 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
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securities laws are designed to prohibit unfair business practices and protect injured
plaintiffs from such illegal conduct. Accordingly, because the distinctions between these
two regulatory schemes are unimportant, the Court properly adapted the standards for
applying the in pari delicto defense in antitrust litigation to the tippee-tipper situation
in Bateman Eichler.
2. Substantially Equal Responsibility Requirement
The holding in Bateman Eichler appears to allow a tipper to assert successfully the
in pari delicto defense if the tipper can meet both requirements of the two-part test.
The first step of the two-part test requires that the tippee, as a direct result of his or her
own actions, bear substantially equal responsibility for the violations he or she seeks to
redress. 259
 The Court's reasoning, however, makes it nearly impossible for the defendant-
tipper ever to show that the plaintiff-tippee's violation of rule 10b-5 is substantially equal
to his or her own violation. Moreover, the Court failed to suggest what "other culpable
actions"24° could render the tippee substantially equally responsible for the injuries and
allow the tipper to assert successfully the in pari delicto doctrine.
The Bateman Eichler Court concluded that in the context of insider trading, the
derivative nature of the tippee's liability under rule 10b-5 rendered the tippee less
culpable than the tipper. 24 ' The tippee's liability is considered derivative in light of the
Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, where the Court made it clear that a tippee acquired a
duty to disclose only if the insider breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders by disclosing
the inside information and the tippee knew or should have known of the breach. 242
Thus, in any consideration of the relative fault of the parties in a tippee-tipper case
based on breach of duty, the fault of the tipper always would outweigh the fault of the
tippee, without regard to the specific facts of the case.
The Court was too quick to conclude, however, that a tippee could not bear equal
responsibility for the 10b-5 violation. Nothing in Dirks indicated that breach of duty by
2" Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310-11.
2" Id. at 314.
24]
	 at 313. The Court also noted in a footnote, however, that a tippee may be liable, apart
from the derivative liability theory, if he or she otherwise "misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s]
the information." Id. at 313 n.22. Justice Stevens' concurrence and Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in Chiarella suggested the "misappropriation" theories of rule 10b-5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens suggested that the tippee's breach of duty arose not from a failure to disclose
material nonpublic information to the other trader, but from a breach of duty owed to the source
of the information. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). In the usual tippee-tipper suit, however, the
tipper is generally the party in the fiduciary relationship with the source of the information, thus
breach of duty only would establish a derivative chain of liability for the tippee.
Chief Justice Burger suggested that there is a duty to disclose information which a trader
acquires through an illegal act, regardless of the fiduciary relationship of the parties. Id. at 240
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). This theory, however, leads to a broader application of the "disclose or
refrain" rule, a result which is contradictory to the current restrictive approach of the Court in this
area. Neither misappropriation theory, therefore, appears to be useful to the tipper to prove the
"substantially equal responsibility" element necessary for the application of the in pari delicto
defense. In any event, the Court has not expressly adopted either theory as a basis for tippee
liability. See generally Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restate-
ment, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44-52 (1982) (discussing misappropriation theories).
242 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
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the tippee caused less serious injury or harm to shareholders than the selective disclosure
of the inside information by the tipper. Indeed, the Dirks Court stated that the "trans-
actions of those who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach [using
inside information for personal advantage] are 'as forbidden' as transactions ... [by the
fiduciary] himself." 243 Moreover, by focusing on the nature of the duty imposed upon
the parties, the Court overlooked the fact that in the tippee-tipper context, although the
parties commit separate violations of the securities laws, 244 both parties must commit
violations to create the harm to the innocent shareholders and result in the injury
suffered by the complaining tippee. By summarily concluding that tippees are less
culpable than tippers because of the derivative nature of their duty, the Court failed to
compare properly the tippee's and tipper's - responsibility for the 10b-5 violation.
The Court did note briefly the potentially broader range of violations which a tipper
might commit, including breach of duty towards the issuer and the shareholders by
disclosing selectively insider information and fraud against the tippee if that information
is false. 245 The Court correctly pointed out that these violations, absent any other viola-
tions by the tippee other than trading on the inside information, would render a tipper
more culpable than a tippee.246 The Court was incorrect, however, in giving these
243 Id. at 659 (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951)).
244 The plaintiffs' violation consists of trading on the basis of inside information. The defen-
dants' violation, consists of tipping the inside information. See Comment, Tippee Suits, supra note
227, at 1094-95.
29.5
	 Eichler, 472 U.S. at 313-14. The tippees contended that because they could not
inherit a duty to disclose false information, it was legally impossible for the tippees to violate rule
10b-5 by failing to disclose before trading. Id. at 311 n.21 (emphasis added). The Bateman Eichler
Court did not address the issue of the duty to disclose false information but noted that lower
federal courts supported the theory that the tippee's unsuccessful fraud was a violation under rule
10b-5's reference to any practice which "would operate" as a fraud. Id. In any event, resolution of
this issue would not aid the tipper in successfully asserting the in pari delicto defense. If the tippees
do not inherit a duty to disclose false information, failure to disclose does not violate rule 10b-5
and the in pan delicto defense is not applicable. If the tippees do inherit a duty to disclose false
information under rule 10b-5, the Bateman Eichler Court already has concluded that the derivative
nature of this liability renders the tippee less culpable than the tipper and thus, the tipper cannot
use the in pan delicto defense to bar the tippee's action.
246 1d. at 314. The Securities Industry Association, in its amicus brief, argued that liability of
the tipper — the brokerage firm, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. — could not possibly equal
or exceed the fault of the plaintiffs, because the brokerage firm played only a "vicarious" role as
"controlling person" of the defrauding tipper. See Brief of Securities Industry Association, Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23, Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) [hereinafter SIA Brief].
The Court expressed no views on the issue of whether the in pari delicto defense should bar
recovery against an employer who acts only as the "controlling person" of the defrauding tipper,
noting that the issue was not raised by the Ninth Circuit or before the BatEman Eichler Court.
Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 314 n.25. The difficulty in resolving the issue of the availability of the
in pari delicto defense to employers as controlling persons results from a lack of judicial agreement
over the scope of controlling person liability. Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act imposes controlling
person liability unless the controlling person "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). The SEC's
position, however, endorsed by a majority of the courts, is that the common-law doctrine of
respondeat superior makes employers liable for the acts of their employees without the limitation
of the good faith defense provided by section 20(a). See, e.g., Marbury Management v. Kohn, 629
F•2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.) (where respondeat superior principles are applied, the good faith defense
afforded by section 20(a) is unavailable), cert. denied sub nom. Wood Walker & Co. v. Marbury
Management, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). Other courts, in contrast, have held that section 20(a) was the
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potential additional violations the weight of a finding of actual violations by the tipper.
Rather than comparing the potential securities violations by the tipper with the actual
violations of the tippee, the Court should have held that both parties' actual violations
would be the basis for assessing relative culpability for determining the availability of
the in pari delicto defense.
The Bateman Eichler Court attempted to leave open the possibility of the in pari
delicto defense by declaring that there may be other culpable actions by a tippee which
could outweigh the potential violations of the tipper and render the tippee substantially
equally responsible as the tipper. 247 It is unlikely, however, that a tipper could show, on
a motion to dismiss, other culpable actions to bar the plaintiff's suit because the court
must accept as true the allegations set forth in the tippee's complaint. 248 It is unlikely
that the tippee would allege actions which a court might consider sufficiently culpable
to result in dismissal of the lawsuit.
Furthermore, because the Bateman Eichler Court failed to suggest what other actions
would be sufficient to find a tippee in pari delicto with the tipper, the defense may not
be successful at a later stage in the litigation. In its ainicus brief, the SEC noted that a
tippee may have substantially equal or greater fault than the tipper-defendant where
the tippee-plaintiff was involved in an actual conspiracy with the tipper to misuse the
information for their mutual benefit or where the tippee-plaintiff instigated the tipper's
violation of law. 249 The Court did not adopt these suggestions, however. As a result, the
Court gives no guidance as to the nature of "other culpable actions" by the tippee that
the tipper would need to prove in order to use the in pari delicto defense at another
stage in the litigation.
3. Promotion of the Securities Laws
The tipper may bar the tippee's action only if he or she satisfies both parts of the
two-part test. Under the second part of the test, preclusion of the suit must not interfere
significantly with the enforcement of the securities laws. 25° In Bateman Eichler, the Court
concluded that denying the in pari delicto defense and thus allowing the suit to proceed
would best protect the investing public and the national economy. 251 The Court based
its conclusion on several factors, including the need for private actions in the securities
area to expose and deter fraudulent practices. 252 In addition, the Court reasoned that
exclusive source of liability. See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton, 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978)
(the controlling person provision of the 1934 Act supplants vicarious liability of employer under
respondeat superior doctrine). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether the
common-law doctrine remains available under the securities laws. The Court would need to resolve
this issue before it could determine the relative culpability of employers.
247 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 314.
248 Berner, 730 F.2d at 1320.
2" Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S.
299 (1985) [hereinafter SEC Brief]. Section 1725(d) of the Federal Securities Code of the American
Law Institute would recognize the defense of in pari delicto in specified circumstances, after
considering the deterrent effect of the particular type of liability, the financial and legal sophisti-
cation of the parties, and the parties' relative responsibility for the loss incurred. FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1725(d) (1980).
2" Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 31 1.
251 Id. at 315.
222 Id. at 315-16.
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deterrent pressures aimed at a smaller, identifiable group of tippers would be more
effective than measures aimed at the potentially larger group of tippees. 255 Moreover,
other deterrent measures were available which would serve to curb tippee trading other
than preclusion of the tippee's suit against the tipper. 264 In light of the Court's reasoning,
the tipper would rarely, if ever, be able to show that denial of the tippee-plaintiff's suit
through the in part delicto defense would not interfere significantly with the enforcement
of the securities laws.
The Court's conclusion that denial of the tippee's suit would interfere with the
effective enforcement of the securities laws was based in large measure on the SEC's
assertion in its amicus brief that it could not prosecute false tipping effectively without
the exposure of the practice provided by private actions brought by tippees. 255 The
Bateman Eichler Court endorsed this argument, noting that litigation between guilty
parties serves an important function of exposing unlawful conduct that might otherwise
go undetected and unremedied.256 This reasoning is questionable, however, in at least
two respects. First, it is inconsistent with the trend in recent Supreme Court decisions to
restrict the scope of 10b-5 liability and increase the burden on plaintiffs bringing actions
under this rule. 267 For example, under the Court's decision in Chiarella, an innocent
investor who enters into a transaction with a party who is misusing or has misappro-
priated confidential information has no cause of action against that party in the absence
of a duty to disclose to the innocent investor. 258 Yet in Bateman Eichler, the Court has
355 1d. at 317 & n.29. The Court cited in a footnote a 1977 article by a student commentator,
who suggested that deterrent pressures aimed exclusively at tippees, even if proportionately as
successful as measures aimed at tippers, still would leave a number of violations undeterred because
of the large class of tippees. Id. at 317 n.29 (citing Comment, Availability of An In Pari Delicto Defense
in Rule 10b-5 Tippee Suits, 77 Cotum. L. REV. 1084, 1096-97 (1977)). This student commentator
also noted that, aside from a tipper's greater responsiveness CO deterrent pressures, both parties'
potential risks support an even stronger argument for allowing tippee recovery. See Comment,
Tippee Suits, supra note 227, at 1097. The commentator observed that while the tippee can regulate
the amount of risk incurred in trading on inside information, the tipper, in contrast, has no control
over the extent of the tippee's potential losses from trading. Id, at 1097 & n.91. This resulting
uncertainty, the commentator suggested, in itself would have a deterrent value. Id. at 1097.
2" Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 318 & n.32.
255 Id. at 315. See SEC Brief, supra note 249, at 5.
"6 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 315-16 (citing Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706
n.3 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting)). Judge Godbold, dissenting in Kuehnert, noted that
"litigation among guilty parties serves to expose their unlawful conduct and render them more
easily subject to the appropriate civil, administrative and criminal penalties." Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at
706 n.3 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
2" See supra notes 139-60, 171 and accompanying text discussing the Court's decisions nar-
rowing the scope of liability under rule 10b-5.
258 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). In Moss, an employee of an investment
banking firm retained to evaluate a tender offer and a stockbroker who learned of the tender offer
were not traditional corporate insiders. Id. at 15. Therefore, they owed no duty of disclosure to the
shareholders who unwittingly sold stock of the target company prior to the announcement of the
tender offer. Id. In contrast, if the defendants had "tipped" this confidential information, their
tippees could maintain an action against them in the event of a trading loss without the bar of the
in part delicto defense. See Romano, Is 'Berner' What Insider Protection Is All About?, Legal Times,
July I, 1985, at 33, col. 1, reprinted in, L.A. Daily J., at 4, col. 1 (discussing Bateman Eichler decision
in light of recent rule 10b-5 cases).
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endorsed a lawsuit by someone who admittedly tried to trade on inside information.
Thus, the innocent investor could not sue the tippee, who is trying to trade on inside
information, but the tippee could sue his or her tipper. Although both situations involve
the misuse of inside information, the Court's decision allows only the plaintiff who has
participated in that misuse, not the innocent plaintiff, to sue for recovery. The Court
does not explain the apparent contradiction between these two situations, although one
possible explanation is that the distinction follows recent cases which indicate that the
Court views the primary purpose of rule 1013-5 as the prevention of fraudulent gains by
fiduciaries, rather than as a broad provision for the protection of the investing public- 259
This does not explain, however, why the Court appears to regard the tipping of false
information as an illegal practice to be exposed and sanctioned, yet regards the misuse
of inside information as insufficient to maintain a private cause of action unless the
innocent investor establishes the insider's requisite duty to the investor. 26°
A second inconsistency arises from the Court's endorsement of private actions by
tippees as a necessary enforcement tool and the Court's subsequent observation that
other measures are available to discourage suits by tippees against their tippers. 261 In
response to an argument that denial of the in pari delicto defense would increase tippee
trading because of the availability of recovery against the tipper, the Court pointed out
that an effective deterrent against tippee trading and tippee lawsuits was the tippee's
exposure to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties under rule 1013-5 and
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. 262 Thus, the Court concluded that the in pari delicto
defense should be denied to encourage private suits by tippees, yet noted that if the
tippees brought such actions, they would expose themselves to substantial penalties. This
inconsistency undercuts the Court's assertion that denying the in pari delicto defense in
order to encourage private actions best serves the securities laws.
In summary, the Court's analysis of the second step of the in pari delicto test imposes
a heavy burden on tippers who-attempt to show that denial of the tippee lawsuit does
not harm the policy aims of the securities laws. The Court has endorsed private actions
by tippees as necessary aids to the declining SEC enforcement resources, especially in
light of the growing size and complexity of the securities market. 265 Thus, given the
Court's support for this private enforcement remedy, it is virtually impossible for the
tipper to show that preclusion of the tippee suit would not interfere with promoting the
goals of the securities laws.
26'i See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, the Court stated that not all breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with securities transactions violate rule 10h-5; breaches must involve
actual manipulation or deception. Id. at 654. The Dirks dissent noted: "[t]he Court today takes still
another step to limit the protection provided investors by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." Id. at 667-68 (Blackmun; J., dissenting). See also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977) (narrowing the definition of fraud under rule 10b-5 to those actions clearly involving
"manipulation and deceit"); Note, Availability of Defense, supra note 160, at 542-43 (concluding that
Supreme Court views rule 1011•5's purpose as preventing fraudulent gains by fiduciaries).
26° Set Romano, supra note 258, at 4, col. I.
26 ' Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 315, 318 & n.32. The Court noted these other factors included
the requirement of proving that the defendant acted with scienter and the threat of civil and
criminal sanctions under the 1934 Act and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. Id. at 318.
262 hi. at 318 & n.32.
265 Id. at 315 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983)).
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B. Effectiveness of the Bateman Eichler Decision in Deterring Insider Trading
Despite the Court's holding in Bateman Eichler that the in pari delicto defense may
be available to bar the tippee's suit if the tipper satisfies the two-part test, the analysis
above leads to the conclusion that the defense is unavailable to the defendant-tipper. If
the defense is in fact unavailable to the tipper, two questions arise. First, does denial of
the in pari delicto defense effecuate the objectives of rule 10b-5? 264 If so, should courts
reject the in pari delicto defense entirely in the securities law context?
Denial of the in pari delicto defense does effecuate the objectives of rule 10b-5
because it allows private actions by tippees to become an actual threat to tippers by
removing the most significant obstacle barring tippee lawsuits. In Bateman Eichler, the
Court denied the in pari delicto defense and placed narrow limits on its use based on
the premise that the threat of private suit by tippees would deter tippers from initiating
fraudulent schemes through disseminating false information. For this premise to be
valid, however, there must be an actual threat of private suit by the tippee. The Court
pointed out that although tippees no longer would face the possibility of dismissal by
the in pari delicto doctrine, other factors discouraging tippee suits still would exist,
however, such as the scienter requirement and the potential for civil and criminal
sanctions on the tippee's own behavior. 265
 Thus, denying to tippers the use of the in pari
delicto defense only effecuates the deterrent objectives of rule 10b-5 if, despite these
additional factors, more tippees bring actions against their tippers.
Closer examination of these factors reveals that they do not present a significant
obstacle to tippee suits. Tippees will bring suit against their tippers only if they trade on
the tipped information to their detriment. A detrimental result may occur if the inside
information given to the tippee is intentionally false, materially misleading, or deceptive
by virtue of exaggeration. In these cases, it may be relatively easy for the plaintiff to
prove the elements of scienter, because the tipper knowingly intended to deceive the
tippee. 2" Because most of the tippee-tipper lawsuits raised in the past fifteen years have
alleged some element of fraud or deceit by the tipper, 262 this requirement of scienter
does not appear sufficiently burdensome to discourage tippees from bringing suit.
The civil and criminal sanctions provided by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act also
fail to provide a significant disincentive to deter private actions by tippees. As noted
previously, the Bateman Eichler Court cited the potential threat of sanctions under the
1984 Act as an effective deterrent to tippee lawsuits. 268 The Court's reliance on the
effectiveness of the 1984 Act against tippee lawsuits, however, is unsound. First, the
264 See supra note 231 for a discussion of the policies underlying rule 10b-5.
262 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 318 & n.32.
266
 Scienter is an element of a rule 10b-5 action. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). The
scienter element is satisfied for an insider-tipper when he or she knowingly discloses information
that he or she knows is material and nonpublic to one who might be reasonably expected to use it
to his or her advantage. Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
26 ' In most cases, the tippees accuse the tippers of actively misrepresenting that they have inside
information about imminent events that will affect the market price of a particular corporation's
stock. See, e.g., Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1153 (merger failed to occur). The tippee also may allege that
the tipper failed to disclose all relevant information concerning a corporation. See, e.g., Kirkland v.
E.F. H utton,  564 F. Supp. 427, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (tipper did not reveal potentially discouraging
information about investment to tippee).
258 See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates that Congress primarily aimed the 1984 Act
at corporate insiders and tippers. 269 In addition, because the civil penalty provision in
the 1984 Act measures the penalty in terms of the profits realized or losses avoided by
trading in a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information, 270 the penalty
provision may not apply to a defrauded tippee who has lost money by trading on the
inside information. 271
Uncertainty over the scope of tippee liability under the 1984 Act in light of the
Court's decision in Dirks272 also may render the Act ineffective against tippees. Congress's
failure to define "insider trading"273 and identify clearly those persons and activities
subject to the 1984 Act creates confusion as to the 1984 Act's applicability to tippees.
The 1984 Act sanctions anyone who trades "while in possession or . material nonpublic
information.274 Under the Dirks standard, in contrast, a tippee does not violate rule 10b-
5 by merely possessing inside information while trading; instead, the tipper must breach
a fiduciary duty to shareholders of which the tippee knew or should have known before
the tippee acquires a duty to disclose or abstain. 275 Because the House Report expressly
states that Congress did not intend the 1984 Act to change the underlying case law of
insider trading, 276 it appears the narrow construction given tippee liability in Dirks limits
the 1984 Act. Apparently, the House Committee which reported on the 1984 Act
recognized the potential impact that judicial interpretation of the Dirks decision might
have in limiting the effectiveness of the Act, because the Committee directed the SEC
to monitor the effects of Dirks on the SEC's insider trading program for at least two
years.277 Thus, despite the broad scope of liability indicated in the "mere possession"
language of the 1984 Act and the stated intention of Congress to provide the SEC with
269 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 9. The House Report noted that the penalty would be
imposed on "persons who aid and abet violations by communicating ('tipping') material nonpublic
information" because these persons are "most directly culpable in a violation." Id. To date, the SEC
has used the sanctions available under the Act in only one enforcement action in a traditional
insider trading case. SEC v. Ablan, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1191,847
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984).
270
	 REPORT, supra note 161, at 8.
271 See Note, Rule 10b-5 — Application of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Suits Brought Against
Securities Brokers by Customers who have Traded on Inside Information, 37 VAND. L. REV. 557,582 n.176
(1984).
272 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See supra notes 146-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
scope of tippee liability under Dirks.
273 Housr. REPORT, supra note 161, at 13. Congress specifically declined to define "insider
trading" to avoid creating "new ambiguities." Id. at 13.
274 Id. at 9.
275 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
276 HOUSE RErwer, supra note 161, at 13. The American liar Association's Task Force on Insider
Trading Regulation, preparing a lengthy analysis in 1984 of the existing federal statutory regulation
of insider trading, concluded that Congress should not have left to further case-by-case development
the basic policy question of what uses of inside information were unlawful, but instead should have
provided a statutory definition of what trading activity on the basis of inside information was
prohibited. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading at 4 (Discussion Draft 1984)
(available in the St. Louis University Law School Library). The Task Force concluded that the case
law development under rule 10b-5 was confused and did not warn predictably what conduct may
be unlawful; thus, it provided an uncertain statutory basis for the penalty provisions of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act. Id. at 4-5.
2" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 161, at 15.
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an additional enforcement too1, 278 the restrictive scope of tippee liability under Dirks
limits the 1984 Act's effectiveness against tippees.
Thus, given the minimal impact which the scienter requirement and the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act have on discouraging tippees from bringing private actions, the
importance of the decision in Bateman Eichler becomes apparent. Denial of the in pari
delicto defense removes the most significant obstacle barring tippee lawsuits, thus allow-
ing private actions by tippees to become an actual threat to deter tippers from disclosing
false or misleading information. This threat is particularly important in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions which have imposed a heavy burden of proof upon
plaintiffs in rule 10b-5 insider trading cases,278 reducing the threat of private suit by
non-tippee plaintiffs. The Court's restrictive approach to 10b-5 liability has diminished
the force of rule I Ob-5 as an effective weapon against insider trading. 28° In Bateman
Eichler, however, the Court in effect added an implied private action for damages by a
tippee as a weapon to deter insider trading, a weapon which also aids SEC enforcement
efforts by exposing the illegal practices of tippers. Thus, after Bateman Eichler, tippers
face a triple threat: actual threat of action by defrauded tippees, increased threat of SEC
sanctions, and increased severity of sanctions under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act.
The Court should not eliminate the in pari delicto defense completely, however,
because of the possible increase in tippee trading which might result from providing
tippees with the potential ability to recover losses from their tippers. The Court failed
to address adequately the argument that denial of the in pari delicto defense would
increase tippee trading by creating an enforceable warranty for tippees. 28 ' As noted
above, the scienter requirement and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act are not effective
to deter tippee trading.
For this reason, the Court's decision not to eliminate completely the in pari delicto
defense is important. Although the Court did not identify the situations where the
relative culpabilities of the parties merit a "different mix of deterrent incentives,"282 the
possibility that the Court would allow the in pari delicto defense, and thus deny the
tippee suit, theoretically exists. Even though the Court did not adopt the suggestion, the
SEC, in its amicus brief, noted that courts should apply the defense to bar claims where
the plaintiff has instigated the scheme or actually was involved in the conspiracy to
misuse the information. 283 Even this slight possibility of the availability of the in pari
delicto defense should serve to deter some tippee trading.
278 See id. at 8.
279 See cases cited supra note 51. See generally Gilbert, Proving a Securities Fraud Case After the
Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Will the Implied Cause of Action Survive?, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 835
(1983) (discussing recent decisions which have made recovery in implied civil actions under the
federal securities laws more difficult).
288 See Note, Dirks v. SEC: The Supreme Court Establishes the Standard for Tippee Liability Under Rule
10B -5, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 217, 238 (1984).
281 Bate-min Eichler, 472 U.S. at 317-18.
282 1d. at 317.
283 SEC Brief, supra note 249, at 5. One student commentator has suggested a comparative
fault approach would deter both tippees and tippers. See Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto
Defense in Tippee
- Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions After Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 519, 544 (1984).
Under this approach, courts should consider such factors as the tippee's sophistication, the tipper's
conduct, who initiated the fraudulent activity, the conduct of the parties before and after the
tippee's initial trading, and whether the tippee actually became a co-conspirator in the fraudulent
scheme. Id. at 544-55.
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Furthermore, there are several possible reasons why unavailability of the in pari
delicto defense should not increase significantly tippee trading. First, a relationship of
trust and confidence established with the tipper, rather than the ability to recover from
the tipper in the event of a loss, usually motivates the tippee in part to trade on the
inside information. 284
 Second, the 1984 Act still may be effective against successful
tippees, depending on future interpretations of Dirks. In addition, if denying the in pari
delicto defense to tippers effectively discourages tippers from disseminating inside in-
formation, denial of the defense should reduce the volume of tippee trading.
In sum, the Court's analysis of the standard to be applied to the in pari delicto
doctrine in 10b-5 actions deters insider trading. Allowing the private action to proceed
in tippee-tipper I Ob-5 suits will provide a deterrent effect on the activities of tippers and
thus, promote the goals of the federal securities laws. Furthermore, the possibility that
courts will apply the in pari delicto defense to deny tippee recovery in situations where
the tippee is as culpable as the tipper in violating the securities laws minimizes the danger
of increased tippee trading.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bateman Eichler v. Berner provides the courts with
a two-part test to evaluate the availability of the in pari delicto defense to implied private
damages actions under the federal securities laws. In applying this test, the Court found
that, upon the defendant-tippers' motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants could
not bar the plaintiffs' action by the in pari delicto defense. Despite the apparent avail-
ability of the in pari delicto doctrine to defendants, the Court's analysis effectively
eliminated the doctrine as a bar to defrauded tippees' claims under rule 10b-5.
This result seems to contrast with recent decisions in the insider trading area which
have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue under rule 10b-5. Yet, while it may seem
contradictory that a tippee, admittedly in violation of the securities law, can maintain an
action under rule 106-5 where an innocent investor might be unable to do so, this result,
nevertheless, is the better approach to achieving the goals of the securities laws in the
context of a tippee-tipper lawsuit. Denial of the in pari delicto defense exposes tippers
to the potential threat of suit by tippees, in addition to the existing threat of SEC
prosecution and increased sanctions under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. This
increased pressure on tippers should deter disclosure of material, nonpublic information
by tippers and accordingly, decrease the volume of insider trading. Thus, the narrow
limits the Bateman Eichler Court has placed on the availability of the in pari delicto
doctrine in the context of the federal securities laws best promote one of the goals of
the federal securities laws — to protect the investing public — and specifically, the goal
of rule 10b-5 — to prohibit fraudulent practices by market participants.
EILEEN M. FIELDS
284 See Comment, Tippee Suits, supra note 227, at 1097.
